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Failed Analogies: Justice Thomas’s
Concurrence in Biden v. Knight First
Amendment Institute
Sarah S. Seo*
Twenty-six years ago, twenty-six words created the internet.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is a short, yet powerful, provision that notably protects social media platforms, among
other interactive computer services, from liability for content created by third-party users. At the time of its enactment, Section 230
aimed to encourage the robust growth of the then-nascent internet
while protecting it from government regulation. More recently, however, it has been wielded by Big Tech companies like Twitter and
Facebook to prevent any liability for real-world harms that stem
from virtual interactions conducted over their platforms.
Although the Supreme Court has never taken on a Section 230
case itself, Justice Thomas individually stands out as one of the most
prominent anti-Section 230 advocates today. When the Supreme
Court declined to hear a Section 230 case in 2020, Justice Thomas
issued a statement respecting the Court’s denial that planted the
seeds for his disapproval of the statute. When the Court issued a
brief opinion in 2021 instructing a lower court to dismiss a Section
230 case as moot due to the change in the presidential administration, Justice Thomas issued a second statement concurring in the
opinion, continuing his charge against Big Tech companies that
profit from Section 230 immunity. Most recently, when the Court
*
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declined to hear a Section 230 case in 2022, Justice Thomas issued
his third statement imploring either Congress to step in or potential
litigants to bring up an “appropriate case” so the Supreme Court
could interpret Section 230 itself.
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Biden v. Knight First
Amendment Institute—his second pass at Section 230—provides
Justice Thomas’s most substantive call for reform. His opinion proposes recommendations for how the legislature should treat digital
platforms and social media companies, analogizing them to common carriers and places of public accommodation. This Note rejects
both analogies. To reach this conclusion, this Note examines the histories of both proposed common law frameworks and the creation
of Section 230 itself. Finally, this Note suggests limiting this powerful immunity by excluding digital platforms that exhibit deliberate
indifference to unlawful or harmful content, or subsequent conduct
arising from such content.
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INTRODUCTION
Tweets on Twitter led to an assault on the Capitol building of
the United States.1 Posts on Facebook allegedly sparked multiple
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel.2 But neither Twitter nor Facebook
directly penned the content that incited violence. Instead, Twitter
and Facebook users—third-party content providers—penned the
posts independently. Accordingly, Twitter and Facebook wield
powerful shields of immunity under a small yet mighty statute in the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), Section 230, and escape
liability entirely.3
How did we come to live in a world where a quick Facebook
post or tweet can lead to such devastating results, yet leave the host
platforms scot-free from liability? Part I of this Note starts to answer
this question by diving into the historical and legislative background
of Section 230. The dawn of the Cyber Age saw many novel types
of internet service providers (“ISPs”), making it difficult for courts
to map these new methods of communication and information dispersal onto preexisting liability schemes.4 In particular, two New
York cases—Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.5 and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.6—produced outcomes so contradictory with one another that Congress intervened and attempted to
resolve the tension. Thus, Section 230 was born.
Since its enactment, however, lower courts have consistently
muddied the waters by broadly interpreting the provision in ways
1

See Graeme Massie, A Timeline to Insurrection: The Trump Tweets That Security
Experts Say Led to the Capitol Riots, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 18, 2021, 8:09 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/trump-tweetsattacks-capitol-violence-b1786246.html [https://perma.cc/5NBZ-DPK4] (stating that
Trump’s rhetoric in his Tweets “eventually led to insurrection and bloodshed at the
Capitol.”).
2
See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2019) (arising out of claims
alleging that Hamas used Facebook to post content that encouraged terrorist attacks in
Israel).
3
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
4
Compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(finding that the internet-based company functioned like a distributor), with Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995) (finding that the internet-based company functioned like a publisher).
5
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
6
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710.
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that expand its reach.7 Although the Supreme Court has yet to substantively address how to properly apply Section 230, Justice
Thomas has independently expressed his views on lower courts’
statutory interpretations.8 Part II of this Note explains that in these
statements, Justice Thomas expressed his dissatisfaction with what
is, in his opinion, a “too-common practice of reading extra immunity
into statutes where it does not belong.”9 In his most substantive
statement on this topic in Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute,10 Justice Thomas reiterated his disapproval of lower courts’ interpretations of Section 230 and instead suggested alternative frameworks to address social media platforms.11 Specifically, he urged
legislators to utilize two common law doctrines historically applied
to narrow the private right to exclude: the common carrier doctrine
and the public accommodations doctrine.
Part III of this Note rejects both of Justice Thomas’s proposals
to treat digital platforms as common carriers or places of public accommodation. First, inherent in the common carrier doctrine is the
idea that the entity indiscriminately holds itself out to the general
public. Social media platforms only allow those with preexisting
phone numbers or email accounts to register.12 These platforms do
not avail themselves to the general public. Moreover, these platforms openly use algorithms to individualize content to each user.13
This editorial discretion precludes platforms’ designations as common carriers.14 Second, textual arguments forbid defining a place of
public accommodation as anything other than specifically

7

See infra Part I.C.
See generally Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13
(2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari); Biden v. Knight First
Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring); Doe v.
Facebook, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1087 (2022) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari).
9
Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 15 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
10
141 S. Ct. 1220 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra note 197.
13
See infra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Part III.A; Christopher S. Yoo, The First Amendment, Common Carriers,
and Public Accommodations: Net Neutrality, Digital Platforms, and Privacy, 1 J. FREE
SPEECH L. 463, 496 (2021) (“[E]ntities that opt to exercise editorial discretion over some
services are [not] common carriers . . . with respect to those services.”).
8
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enumerated physical spaces. This does not include non-physical
spaces, such as a website.15 Even if a court did extrapolate the “public accommodations” definition to include non-physical spaces,
Congress’s intent behind Section 230’s enactment does not support
an imposition of public accommodation duties.
Reviewing the history used to support Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Biden v. Knight, this Note argues that Justice Thomas’s proposed analogies must fail. Drawing these analogies and thereby limiting digital platforms’ right to exclude would hamstring the ability
to fight disinformation at a crucial time when its proliferation is
harming society. This Note concludes by offering a suggestion for
reform that would remove immunity for interactive service providers or users who deliberately ignore unlawful content or the threat
of harmful conduct arising from such content. Social media platforms must bear responsibility for the dangerous ways users abuse
seemingly-beneficial algorithms to connect like-minded people.16
At the end of the day, it must be social media platforms’ responsibility to monitor the proliferation of objectively false information
with the capacity to spur dangerous reactions beyond just the
screen.17
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 230
A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is ensuring all
people have access to places where they can speak, listen, and engage with others.18 In the past, streets and parks served as quintessential forums within which individuals exercised their First
Amendment rights.19 The internet’s advent, however, created

15

See infra note 232.
See generally Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (providing Section
230(c) immunity to Facebook for its alleged assistance to Hamas terrorist attacks, where
Facebook’s “matchmaking” algorithms connected members of the Hamas group).
17
See, e.g., Greg Miller et al., A Mob Insurrection Stoked by False Claims of Election
Fraud and Promises of Violent Restoration, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021, 8:49 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-capitol-mob-attackorigins/2021/01/09/0cb2cf5e-51d4-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6Q2A-CKHD].
18
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
19
See id.
16
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difficulties. Were all websites subject to the same responsibilities
and consequences? And did such consequences manifest as publisher liability or distributor liability? Was there a distinction between websites that moderated content, as opposed to those that did
not? Following two cases whose opposite conclusions created an insoluble rift in website liability, Congress sought to resolve these
questions by enacting Section 230 of the CDA. But, with new solutions came new problems.
To lay the foundation for Justice Thomas’s later critique, this
Part begins by briefly describing the early stages of the internet and
the cases that gave rise to Section 230. It then evaluates the first case
to interpret Section 230 after its enactment which opened the door
to broad statutory interpretations that prevail today.
A. The Internet as the New Public Forum
The Supreme Court recognizes that the most important place for
individuals to exchange views in today’s society is cyberspace: “the
‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media
in particular.”20 Americans use social media to engage in a wide array of topics “as diverse as human thought.”21
In the internet’s early stages, courts faced the difficult task of
trying to fit ISPs within the frameworks of traditional common law
publisher-distributor liability.22 Under this framework, a party is liable for distributing defamatory material if it has knowledge of the

20

Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
Id. at 1735–36 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (internal quotations omitted)).
22
See Stephanie Blumstein, The New Immunity in Cyberspace: The Expanded Reach of
the Communications Decency Act to the Libelous “Re-Poster,” 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
407, 410 (2003) (citing Andrew J. Slitt, Note, The Anonymous Publisher: Defamation on
the Internet After Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union and Zeran v. American Online,
31 CONN. L. REV. 389, 395 (1998)) (“Fundamental to considering cyber-defamation, courts
have had to determine whether to apply to a defendant the standard of liability for a
publisher or a distributor.”); Michelle J. Kane, Note, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 483, 487 (1999) (“With the advent of the Internet, courts struggled to stretch
defamation law to cover statements made in cyberspace.”); Kean J. DeCarlo, Tilting at
Windmills: Defamation and the Private Person in Cyberspace, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 547,
551 (1997) (noting that the difficulty with applying common law frameworks in the context
of internet postings stems from the internet’s analogous characteristics with both traditional
publishers and distributors, each carrying separate liability schemes).
21
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defamatory content, yet fails to remove it.23 Therefore, unless the
party knows or has reason to know of the defamatory material, it
cannot be held liable.24 Newsstands and bookstores are paradigmatic
examples of entities subject to distributor liability.25 On the other
hand, a party is liable for publication of defamatory material if it
exercises editorial control or judgment over the published content.26
Traditional examples include magazines and newspapers.27 Courts
employ a sliding scale from distributor to publisher liability depending on the degree of editorial control the disseminator exerted.28
The digital age’s new landscape consisted of myriad online services.29 Different services included extensive file libraries containing texts and images, bulletin boards providing spaces for users to
post messages for others to read, and discussion groups facilitating
group conversations between participants.30 Some websites allowed
users to freely post on the online platform without review or edits

23

See Sarah Beckett Boehm, Note, A Brave New World of Free Speech: Should
Interactive Computer Service Providers Be Held Liable for the Material They
Disseminate?, 5 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 7, ¶ 6 (1998), http://law.Richmond.edu/
jolt/v5i2/boehm.html [https://perma.cc/TN5M-DG6S].
24
See Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox: Libel, Slander, & the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279, 280 (1999); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984).
25
See Pincus, supra note 24.
26
See DeCarlo, supra note 22, at 552. Publishers can be held liable for defamatory
statements contained in their works even without proof of specific knowledge of the
defamatory statement’s inclusion. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24.
27
See DeCarlo, supra note 22, at 552.
28
See id. (noting that the general rule was that “the more discretion a disseminator of
news has to modify the published information, the higher is the disseminator’s duty of care
and corresponding liability.”); Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of
Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, 72
OKLA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2020) (“A sliding scale for liability developed, based on the
degree to which the transmitter or publisher edited the statement.”); Blumstein, supra note
22, at 409 (“Courts will impose varying degrees of liability depending on the amount of
editorial control a defendant possessed.”).
29
See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, The Big Internet Brands of the ‘90s—Where Are They Now?,
NPR (July 25, 2016, 4:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/07/25/487097344/the-big-internet-brands-of-the-90s-where-are-they-now
[https://perma.cc/PST3-RDWB] (discussing different ISPs in the early days of the
internet).
30
See Matthew C. Siderits, Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1065,
1065 n.2, 1071 (1996).
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from the host site.31 Others engaged in more involved editorial functions, including deleting posts altogether.32 Thus, the early 1990s
saw an asymmetrical application of intermediary liability to ISPs,
ultimately spurring the creation of Section 230 of the CDA.33
B. Background of Section 230
The first case to address whether an ISP is subject to either publisher or distributor liability came in 1991. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., a CompuServe competitor sued the company for libel,
citing allegedly defamatory statements posted on one of CompuServe’s special-interest forums.34 At the time, CompuServe
hosted an online general information service through which subscribers could access thousands of outside sites and special-interest
forums.35 CompuServe did not remove or alter any content posted
by users on its site.36 Accordingly, the court compared CompuServe
to a bookstore, a common example of a distributor of information,
because it did not exert any editorial control.37 Under this framework, CompuServe only faced liability as a distributor if it had either
knowledge or reason to know of the allegedly defamatory content

31

See id. at 1074 (noting that CompuServe had “no power to review the contents” of a
publication it hosted on its site before it was uploaded).
32
See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Personal Computers: An Atlas of Information Services, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/01/science/personal-computersan-atlas-of-information-services.html [https://perma.cc/39VP-MPMT] (noting that in its
early days, Prodigy, among the first ISPs, censored objectionable messages posted by users
on their communal bulletin boards).
33
See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
34
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
35
Id. CompuServe’s special-interest forums were comprised of electronic bulletin
boards, interactive online conferences, and topical databases. Id. The special-interest forum
at issue in this case was called the Journalism Forum. Id. The Journalism Forum published
a daily newsletter, Rumorville USA, that reported on the journalism industry. Id. Rumorville
USA posted the allegedly defamatory comments. Id.
36
Id. (“CompuServe has no opportunity to review Rumorville’s contents before [it is
uploaded] into CompuServe’s computer banks, from which it is immediately available to
approved . . . subscribers.”).
37
Id. at 140 (“CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than
does a public library, book store, or newsstand . . . .”).

1078

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1070

before publishing.38 It was undisputed that CompuServe had neither.39 Thus, the court held CompuServe immune from all liability.40
Four years later, another New York court faced a similar question, yet took a different approach. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co.,41 the court recognized heightened liability
where Prodigy, a web service that hosted online bulletin boards,
made clear it moderated content on its online message boards.42 The
court found that Prodigy’s “conscious choice, to gain the benefits of
editorial control, [sic] opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that [made] no such
choice.”43 Through this holding, the court extended common law
publisher liability to online services.44
Shortly after the Stratton Oakmont decision, a group of ISPs
complained to Congress about the practical consequences they faced
in the case’s wake.45 If the sites attempted to filter content—even in
good faith46—they would subject themselves to the heightened
“publisher” standard of liability.47 Thus, they threatened to adopt a

38

Id. at 139 (“[The knowledge requirement] is deeply rooted in the First Amendment,
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
39
Id. at 141.
40
Id. at 141–42.
41
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
42
Id. at *4 (finding that Prodigy “held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards”). Prodigy’s Vice President and
General Counsel at the time of the suit, however, denies that Prodigy was actively
screening and monitoring postings from its bulletin boards. See Marc Jacobson, Prodigy:
It May Be Many Things to Many People, but It Is Not a Publisher for Purposes of Libel,
and Other Opinions, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 673, 676 (1996). Jacobson
maintains that Prodigy did not screen material itself, but rather employed screening
software that automatically blocked postings containing one of the “seven dirty words,” as
pronounced by the Supreme Court in FCC. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
Jacobson, supra, at 677.
43
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
44
See Catherine Tremble, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social
Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 832 (2017).
45
See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 594 (2001).
46
See Tremble, supra note 44, at 832. In Stratton, Prodigy’s automated screening tool
that amounted to editorial control was used to screen for offensive language and remove
offending content. Id.
47
See Blumstein, supra note 22, at 411–12.
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purely “hands-off” approach to ensure that courts would consider
them distributors rather than publishers.48 Under Stratton Oakmont’s new liability scheme, ISPs were better served by leaving offensive and defamatory content published by its users online, as removing such content created liability.49
Congress recognized it could not reconcile a higher standard of
liability for publisher-ISPs attempting to monitor offensive content
with distributor-ISPs that “let anything go.”50 This asymmetrical liability scheme—coupled with increasing public concern about the
rise of pornography on the internet51—prompted legislative reform
concerning internet regulation.52
Senator James Exon originally introduced the CDA, aiming to
purify the internet53 and keep it from transforming into a “red light
district.”54 Senator Exon was primarily motivated to curtail growing
access to pornography resulting from the internet’s increasing prominence.55 House Representatives Jim Cox and Ron Wyden similarly
pushed for protection from indecency but were more concerned with
an overly government-regulated internet.56 With these goals in
mind, the two representatives introduced an amendment to the
CDA—Section 230.57
48

See Freiwald, supra note 45, at 593; JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. ON
L. & INFO. POL’Y, SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE
LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS 5 (2012), http://www.fordham.edu/
download/downloads/id/1825/clip_section_230_of_the_communications_decency_act_re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GS7-DDGL] [hereinafter CLIP Survey].
49
See Pincus, supra note 24, at 282.
50
CLIP Survey, supra note 48, at 5–6.
51
See Freiwald, supra note 45, at 594 n.110; see generally, Cyberporn and Children:
The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional
Action: Hearings on S. 892 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 169 (1995)
(demonstrating widespread concern about online pornography).
52
See Freiwald, supra note 45, at 594–95.
53
See Ellen Messemer, Sen. Dole Backs New Internet Antiporn Bill, NETWORK WORLD,
June 12, 1995, at 12.
54
Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 51,
53 (1996).
55
See Tremble, supra note 44, at 833.
56
See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden)
(stating that the law should provide relief from indecency on the web without involving
Federal regulation).
57
See Tremble, supra note 44, at 834.
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Section 230 aimed to reverse the liability scheme established in
Stratton Oakmont and encourage ISPs to moderate offensive content
in good faith, without fear of punishment.58 This immunity is specifically addressed in Section 230(c), titled “Protection for ‘Good
Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.”59 Section 230(c) has two parts: (1) “Treatment of publisher or speaker”
and (2) “Civil liability.”60 Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”61 This provision is famously referred
to as the “twenty-six words that created the Internet.”62 It expressly
precludes courts from treating ISPs as publishers within the traditional liability framework.63 Next, Section 230(c)(2) removes liability for any good-faith restriction for objectionable material, even if
such material is constitutionally protected.64 It also removes liability
for providing users the tools to restrict such material.65
C. Zeran and Expansive Immunity
Within one year of the CDA’s enactment, the Supreme Court
struck down portions of the Act as unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.66 Section 230, however, remained intact.67 Section 230
has since ignited significant debate among scholars regarding its interpretation, application, and implications in an increasingly virtual

58

H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep) (“One of the specific purposes of
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not
their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); see also David
Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of
Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 380 (2010).
59
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
60
Id.
61
Id. § 230(c)(1).
62
See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
(2017).
63
See Skorup & Huddleston, supra note 28, at 651.
64
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
65
Id. § 230(c)(2)(B).
66
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
67
See id. at 858–59.
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world.68 The first major—and most significant69—interpretation of
Section 230 came from the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. American
Online, Inc.70 There, the Zeran court focused on policy reasons for
establishing broad immunity for ISPs under Section 230(c)(1) and
interpreted the statute to bar all tort-based liability.71
In Zeran, an anonymous user posted a message on AOL’s bulletin board advertising t-shirts for sale that contained slogans in support of the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing.72 The post
instructed interested purchasers to contact Kenneth Zeran and listed
his personal contact information.73 As a result, Zeran received repeated calls, hate mail, and death threats.74 Zeran notified AOL of
the defamatory “hoax” messages, demanded AOL remove the posts,
and asked for a retraction.75 AOL removed the original posting but
did not post a retraction.76 Over the next five days, an anonymous
user continued to post messages with similar information, which
AOL failed to screen.77 Zeran received threatening calls and messages for the ensuing month.78
Zeran sued AOL for the defamatory postings initiated by a third
party.79 He argued that once he notified AOL of the hoax messages,
AOL had a duty to promptly remove the postings, issue a retraction,
and properly screen any future defamatory material.80 In response,
AOL raised Section 230 as a defense to liability for its role as

68

See CLIP Survey, supra note 48, at 8.
See Eric Goldman & Jeff Kosseff, Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Internet
Law’s Most Important Judicial Decision, in ZERAN V. AMERICAN ONLINE 6, 6 (Eric
Goldman & Jeff Kosseff eds., 2020) (ebook) (“[Zeran] is widely considered the most
important Internet Law ruling ever.”).
70
129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
71
Id. at 330 (noting that immunity applies “to any cause of action” that seeks to impose
liability on ISPs for information originating with users); see also CLIP Survey, supra note
48, at 10.
72
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 330.
80
Id.
69
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publisher of the third-party content.81 Zeran claimed that AOL functioned like a distributor, not a publisher.82 Since Section 230 only
protects publishers, Zeran argued, AOL had no defense against distributor liability.83 The Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran’s distinction
between publisher and distributor immunity.84 The court found Zeran’s narrower reading of “publisher” as wholly separate from “distributor” to be inconsistent with Congress’s policy goals.85 Moreover, it found that permitting liability upon notice for distributors defeated the dual purposes advanced by Section 230: promoting free
speech on the internet and protecting the internet from government
regulations.86
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran influenced subsequent
judicial interpretations of Section 230 protections in two important
ways. First, its broad interpretation of “publisher” expanded the statute’s reach of protection.87 Second, the court indicated that Section
230 protects defendants from any cause of action in which they are
the “publisher or speaker of any information” provided by a thirdparty user.88 Untethering Section 230 from the defamation context
created a world in which defendants could invoke Section 230 immunity in almost all areas of law.89
In the twenty-six years since Section 230’s enactment, courts
have consistently expanded the statute’s protection by broadly
81

Id.
Id. at 331.
83
Id. at 331–32.
84
Id. at 332 (“[Distributor] liability is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability,
and is therefore also foreclosed by [Section] 230.”).
85
Id. at 333 (noting that if ISPs were subject to liability upon notice, i.e., distributor
liability, this would create an impossible burden on ISPs and defeat the dual purposes
advanced by Section 230 of the CDA).
86
Id. (noting that liability upon notice would “reinforce[] service providers’ incentives
to restrict speech,” thereby interfering with the goal to promote free speech on the internet,
and also reinforce their incentives to “abstain from self-regulation,” thereby creating a
greater need for government regulation).
87
Id. at 332 (noting that the distinction between “publisher” and “distributor” indicates
only that different standards of liability may be applied within the larger publisher category
and that “distributors are . . . also a type of publisher for purposes of defamation law.”).
88
Id. at 330–31.
89
Some courts claim there are only two areas of law where Section 230’s immunity is
inapplicable: intellectual property law and federal criminal law. See Tremble, supra note
44, at 843.
82
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construing the definition of “publisher.”90 Courts have also generally construed the text of Section 230(c)(1) in favor of immunity.91
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to take a case interpreting this
increasingly debated statute,92 leading Justice Thomas to write a
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes v.
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC93 and making Justice Thomas
the first Supreme Court Justice to opine on the statute’s application
and interpretation. In Justice Thomas’s opinion, lower courts have
incorrectly expanded Section 230 “beyond the natural reading of the
text.”94 Justice Thomas recognized that Malwarebytes was not the
appropriate case for the Court to interpret Section 230.95 However,
he cautioned that it “behoove[d]” the Court to determine the “correct
interpretation” of Section 230 in the future.96

90

See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003) (expanding the
definition of “publisher” to email listservs); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (expanding the definition of “publisher” to dating
websites); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(expanding the definition of “publisher” to social networking sites), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413
(5th Cir. 2008); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (expanding
the definition of “publisher” to gossip sites).
91
See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Congress inten[ded] to confer broad immunity for the re-publication of
third-party content.”); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There
has been near-universal agreement that [S]ection 230 should not be construed
grudgingly.”); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir.
2014) (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (“[C]lose cases . . . must be resolved in favor
of immunity.”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have
construed the immunity provisions in [Section] 230 broadly in all cases arising from the
publication of user-generated content.”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316,
1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits have interpreted [Section 230] to
establish broad . . . immunity.”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (“[Section] 230(c) provides
broad immunity for publishing content provided by third parties.” (citation omitted));
Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Congress recognized the threat
that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet
medium.”).
92
See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 13 (2020)
(Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (“[The Court has] never interpreted
this provision.”).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 18.
95
Id. at 14.
96
Id. at 18.
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II. JUSTICE THOMAS’S TAKE: MALWAREBYTES AND KNIGHT V.
TRUMP
The Supreme Court has never interpreted the reach of Section
230.97 This has not stopped Justice Thomas, however, from publishing his own thoughts on the statute and the overly broad interpretation he believes courts have read into it.98 The first pass Justice
Thomas took at Section 230, as will be discussed in Part II.A, came
in his statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes.99 This statement made Malwarebytes the first case to produce
Section 230 commentary from the Supreme Court. A year later, Justice Thomas again wrote about Section 230 but, as will be discussed
in Part II.B, this time he included specific proposals calling for its
reform.100 In this statement, Justice Thomas wholly rejected the Second Circuit’s application of the public forum doctrine in the context
of digital platforms.101 He instead pushed for the application of two
alternative common law doctrines: the common carrier doctrine and
the public accommodations doctrine.102 In both proposals, Justice
Thomas argued that digital platforms’ resemblance to these legal
doctrines gives legislators strong arguments for similarly regulating
digital platforms.103

97

While the Supreme Court struck down the anti-indecency portion of the CDA in Reno,
that did not affect the separate provision of Section 230. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
849 (1997). The Supreme Court has previously denied certiorari to Section 230 cases,
including Backpage.com and Force. See generally Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d
229 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 46 (2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d
53 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020). However, the two cases discussed
in this Part comprise two of the three cases from which a Justice has issued further comment
on Section 230. The third and final case producing discussion from Justice Thomas is Doe
v. Facebook, Inc. See 142 S. Ct. 1087 (2022) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari).
98
See Malwarebytes, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 13 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting
denial of certiorari) (“[M]any courts have construed the law broadly to confer sweeping
immunity on some of the largest companies in the world.”).
99
Id.
100
See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222
(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
101
Id. at 1222, 1225.
102 Id. at 1222–25.
103 Id. at 1226 (“The similarities between some digital platforms and common carriers or
places of public accommodation may give legislators strong arguments for similarly
regulating digital platforms.”).
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A. Malwarebytes
In Malwarebytes, two competing software companies enabled
internet users to filter unwanted content from their computers, such
as that posing security risks.104 Enigma Software Group (“Enigma”)
alleged that Malwarebytes reconfigured its software to hamper users
from accessing Enigma’s products, thereby diverting users to use
Malwarebytes.105 In doing so, Enigma alleged that Malwarebytes
engaged in unlawful anticompetitive conduct.106 Malwarebytes responded by invoking a provision of Section 230 that immunized
computer-software providers from liability for providing tools “to
restrict access to material” that it “considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”107
The Ninth Circuit previously recognized that this provision established a subjective standard regarding what online material is
“objectionable.”108 The court, however, distinguished Malwarebytes from the broad recognition of immunity for subjectively objectionable content found in Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc.109
Zango involved a software company—similar to those in Malwarebytes—and a program developer who provided users access to a variety of online entertainment.110 Malwarebytes, on the other hand,
involved two competitors in the software market.111 Highlighting
this crucial difference, the Zango court held that the phrase “otherwise objectionable” did not include software the provider found objectionable for anticompetitive reasons.112
Respecting the Court’s denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes, Justice Thomas issued a statement advocating for future review of

104

Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2019).
105
Id. at 1044.
106 Id. at 1048.
107
Id. at 1051 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)).
108 Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).
109
Id.
110 Id. at 1170.
111 Enigma, 946 F.3d at 1050 (“This is the first [Section] 230 case we are aware of that
involves direct competitors.”).
112 Id. at 1045.
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Section 230.113 Although the issue in Malwarebytes only concerned
Section 230(c)(2)’s safe harbor provision of immunity for restrictions made or facilitated in good faith, Justice Thomas called
for a revision of the entire Section.114 In his statement, Justice
Thomas did not hide his disapproval of the judicial interpretation of
Section 230 since its enactment.115
First, Justice Thomas questioned the Zeran court’s interpretation
of publisher liability as subsuming distributor liability.116 He
pointed to a separate CDA provision, Section 502,117 that explicitly
imposed distributor liability for knowingly displaying obscene material to children.118 He found it “odd” to understand the CDA as
simultaneously eliminating distributor liability under Section 230
yet imposing it under Section 502.119 Justice Thomas also relied on
Congress’s explicit goal of overturning the Stratton Oakmont decision120 to preclude the term “publisher” from having two tiers of liability.121 Since Stratton used the terms “publisher” and “distributor” to distinguish the two categories, rather than “primary publisher” and “secondary publisher,” Congress likely intended for the
word “publisher” as used in Section 230 to mirror the Stratton Oakmont distinction.122 His final textualist argument queried Congress’s
113

See generally Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13
(2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
114 Id. at 18 (calling for restraint of the “sweeping immunity” courts have read into
Section 230 as a whole).
115
Id. at 14 (“Courts have long emphasized nontextual arguments when interpreting
[Section] 230, leaving questionable precedent in their wake.”).
116
Id. at 15 (stating that “there are good reasons to question this interpretation.”).
117 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133–
34 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
118 Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 15 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
119 Id. Justice Thomas fails to point out, however, that Section 502, now codified at 47
U.S.C. Section 223(d), applies specifically in the context of underage children, while
Section 230 applies more generally. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d). This provision is titled
“Sending or displaying offensive material to persons under 18.” Id.
120 H.R. R . N . 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep) (commenting on Sections 509 and
EP
O
230(c)(1)).
121 Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 15 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
122
Id. at 15–16. One prominent scholar in Internet Law interprets the reference to
Stratton Oakmont and the legislative intent behind Section 230 as Justice Thomas
questioning Congress’s intent to overturn the Stratton Oakmont decision. Eric Goldman,
Justice Thomas Writes a Misguided Anti-Section 230 Statement “Without the Benefit of
Briefing”—Enigma v. Malwarebytes, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2020),
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decision against “simply creat[ing] a categorical immunity in [Section] 230(c)(1)” to eliminate both publisher and distributor liability
simultaneously if that is what it intended in the first place.123 Because this categorical language appears in the very next subsection,124 Justice Thomas argued that the difference in language meaningfully supported the separation of “distributor” and “publisher” liability.125
Second, Justice Thomas argued that it was “dubious” “to say that
editing a statement and adding commentary [sic] does not ‘creat[e]
or develo[p]’ the final product, even in part.”126 He argued that ISPs
that take part in creating or developing the final product through traditional editorial functions necessarily fell under the statute’s definition of an “information content provider,” and must therefore be
held liable under Section 230(c)(1).127
Third, Justice Thomas argued for a narrow interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) because to read it broadly rendered Section
230(c)(2)—the Good Samaritan provision—superfluous.128 If Section 230(c)(1) immunized companies from liability to protect any
decision to edit or remove content, that provision swallowed Section
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/10/justice-thomas-writes-a-misguided-antisection-230-statement-without-the-benefit-of-briefing-enigma-v-malwarebytes.htm
[https://perma.cc/FJK5-EG72]. Because Goldman’s interpretation of Justice Thomas’s
statement supports the alternative position that publisher and distributor liability both
collapse into publisher liability, this Author argues that Justice Thomas referenced the
legislative history behind Section 230 to reinforce Congress’s stated goal to overturn
Stratton Oakmont, not to question it.
123
Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 16 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
124 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
125
Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 16 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)
(citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)) (emphasizing that an information content provider
includes “anyone ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development’ of the
content,” and rejecting the interpretation that traditional editorial functions cover “only
substantial or material edits and additions.”). Justice Thomas incorrectly cherry-picks the
definition provided in Section 230(f)(3). He equates anyone responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of a final product with the statute’s actual definition:
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided.” 42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). The provision itself
does not target contributors of the final product.
128 Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 16–17 (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari).
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230(c)(2)’s protection for editorial functions in good faith.129 Justice
Thomas cited Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. to illustrate an instance where,
in his opinion, a court misconstrued the broad reach of Section
230(c)(1).130 Justice Thomas warned that this broad interpretation
has negative real-world effects, like protecting a company that removes content based on racial discrimination.131
Justice Thomas ended his statement132 respecting the denial of
certiorari by conceding that he proceeded entirely “[w]ithout the
benefit of briefing on the merits.”133 That he made such strong critiques of Section 230 as a whole without any briefing on the merits
is reason for pause.
B. Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump
In 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute sued then-President Trump for blocking several users from interacting with his
Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, due to their criticism of his
presidency and policies.134 The Knight Institute alleged that
Trump’s Twitter account constituted a “public forum” under the
First Amendment because he regularly used his account to conduct
official business in his capacity as President of the United States.135
129

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)). Contrary to
Justice Thomas’s claim, this case explains the different and independent applications of the
two provisions he claims are impermissibly collapsed with a broad reading of Section
230(c)(1). See generally Barnes, 570 F.3d 1096. The Barnes court found that Section
230(c)(1) provides complete immunity for all publication decisions for content generated
entirely by third parties. Id. at 1105. Section 230(c)(2), on the other hand, provides an
additional shield for screening or removal actions done in good faith. Crucially, the court
noted that any provider of an interactive computer service can take advantage of Section
230(c)(2) liability, even if unprotected by Section 230(c)(1). Id.
131 Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 18 (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)
(citing Sikhs for Just., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’g, 144
F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2015)).
132
Justice Thomas’s fourth and final argument in Malwarebytes is a critique of the
extension of Section 230’s applicability to traditional product-defect claims. Id. at 17–18
(Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari). The main case discussed in this
Note, Biden v. Knight, involves a First Amendment speech claim. Thus, the discussion is
outside the scope of this Note.
133 Id. at 18.
134 Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549,
553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
135 Id. at 574–75.
130
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Moreover, the statements he made constituted official statements
from the President.136 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
summary judgment in favor of the Knight Institute.137 It agreed with
the lower court’s holding that Trump’s account constituted a “public
forum” because it was intentionally created to be used for public
discussion and official purposes relating to the presidential role.138
Accordingly, selective exclusion based on viewpoint amounted to
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.139
The Supreme Court granted Trump’s petition for a writ of certiorari in April 2021, months after President Biden assumed office.140
Because Trump was no longer President, the Court swiftly vacated
the judgment and ordered the Second Circuit to dismiss the case as
moot in a two-sentence opinion.141 Justice Thomas, however, took
this opportunity to readdress his discontent for courts’ interpretations of Section 230.142 Moreover, in a move that arguably toes the
line between the separation of powers, Justice Thomas encouraged
legislators to reconsider digital platforms through the frameworks of
historical legal doctrines.143
Biden v. Knight is the second case to produce a substantive statement from a Supreme Court Justice regarding the reach of Section
230’s immunity, albeit from the same Justice.144 It is the first,

136

See Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets Are ‘Official Statements,’ CNN
(June 6, 2017, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-officialstatements/ [https://perma.cc/7HAH-Z7JF].
137 Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.
2019).
138 Id. at 237.
139
Id. at 234 (“[I]n blocking the Individual Plaintiffs the President engaged in prohibited
viewpoint discrimination . . . .”).
140 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1220 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 1220–21. In vacating the Second Circuit’s opinion, the Court importantly
eliminated any precedent for treating government officials’ private social media accounts
open to the public as public forums subject to the First Amendment. Id.
142
Id. at 1221. Recall that Justice Thomas’s first expression of discontent with Section
230 appeared in his statement respecting the Court’s denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes.
See supra Part II.A.
143 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1226 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The similarities between some
digital platforms and common carriers or places of public accommodation may give
legislators strong arguments for similarly regulating digital platforms.”).
144 See supra Part II.A.
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however, to address the statute specifically within the context of the
modern digital age at the Supreme Court level. In his concurrence,
Justice Thomas conceded that the principal legal difficulty surrounding digital platforms is that “applying old doctrines to new digital platforms is rarely straightforward.”145 After rejecting the Second Circuit’s initial determination that Trump’s Twitter account operated as a constitutionally protected public forum,146 Justice
Thomas acknowledged that part of the difficulty in navigating digital platforms through frameworks of established legal doctrines
stemmed from the incongruity between privately controlled online
content and publicly available platforms.147 Justice Thomas then
proposed solutions analogous to two common law doctrines that
limit the right of a private company to exclude.148
The following Sections evaluate Justice Thomas’s perspective
on three legal doctrines he discussed in his Biden v. Knight concurrence as applied to digital platforms: (1) the public forum doctrine;
(2) the common carrier doctrine; and (3) the public accommodations
doctrine.
1. Public Forum Doctrine
Justice Thomas rejected the notion that a private account on social media can create a constitutionally protected public forum.149
He argued that the ultimate control lay in the hands of the privately
controlled company and not the private user.150 He further argued
that the Second Circuit’s conclusion that Trump’s Twitter account
constituted a public forum was “in tension with, among other things,
[the Court’s] frequent description of public forums as ‘governmentcontrolled spaces.’”151 Drawing from previous Court dicta, Justice
Thomas defined a designated public forum as “property that the

145

Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1221 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1222.
147 Id.
148
Id.
149 See id. (noting that designation as a public forum depends on governmental control
over that space, and here, “[a]ny control Mr. Trump exercised over the account greatly
paled in comparison to Twitter’s authority”).
150 See id. (“Whether governmental use of private space implicates the First Amendment
often depends on the government’s control over that space.”).
151 Id. (quoting Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018)).
146
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State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.”152
First Amendment application in the context of governmental use
of a private space “depends on the government’s control over that
space.”153 Relying on the Court’s reasoning in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,154 Justice Thomas used two scenarios to illustrate the difference between a government-controlled and non-government-controlled space. In the first scenario, a government agency
rents out a conference room of a hotel to hold a public hearing regarding the agency’s proposed regulation.155 Here, the First Amendment applies because the government controls the space. Accordingly, the government is prohibited from excluding anyone in opposition to its proposal. In the second scenario, government officials
informally gather with constituents in the hotel bar.156 Here, the hotel retains control of the space. Thus, the government officials are
permitted to request removal of individual patrons who hold views
with which they disagree.
Private users of Twitter—the digital platform at issue in Knight
v. Trump—have control over who can interact with their content and
to what extent.157 But, Twitter also reserves the right to completely
remove a user’s account altogether.158 In its Terms of Service, Twitter claims the unrestricted authority to “remove any person from the
platform—including the President of the United States—‘at any
time for any or no reason.’”159
In Justice Thomas’s view, “private parties control the avenues
for speech”160 in the context of digital platforms. This resembles the
second scenario. In the case of the privately-owned Twitter account,

152

Id. at 1221–22 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992)).
153 Id. at 1222.
154
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding that a municipal theater’s prohibition of a theater
company’s show constituted an unlawful prior restraint, and thus violated the theater
company’s First Amendment right in the public forum).
155 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1222 (Thomas, J., concurring).
156
Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1221.
159 Id. (citing TWITTER INC., USER AGREEMENT (2020)).
160 Id. at 1222.
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Justice Thomas viewed Twitter’s “unbridled control of [Trump’s]
account” as sufficient to outweigh any showing of control on
Trump’s part as a governmental actor acting in his official capacity.161 Thus, Twitter’s comparative power over the account precluded its designation as a public forum. Justice Thomas turned next
to offer two other legal doctrines he believed could properly apply.
2. Common Carrier Doctrine
Justice Thomas saw many similarities between digital platforms
and traditional common carriers.162 He listed several factors courts
have historically considered in defining common carriers: whether
the company holds itself out to provide access to all, the extent of
the company’s market power, whether the company operates in industries traditionally regarded as common carriers, and whether the
company receives any governmental benefits or privileges in exchange for common carrier regulation.163
First, Justice Thomas pointed out the common carrier’s “general
requirement to serve all comers.”164 He rooted this consideration in
the historical precedent of our legal system and its British predecessor.165 In his view, that digital platforms made themselves available
to the public supported the application of the common carrier doctrine to these online platforms.166
Next, Justice Thomas acknowledged that scholarship is split on
whether market power is an adequate indicator of common carriage
status.167 Nonetheless, he argued that the “analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital platforms that have dominant market
share.”168 He provided examples of Facebook and Google’s dominance in their respective markets to illustrate that these industries
may have substantial barriers to entry.169
161

Id.
Id. at 1224.
163 See generally id. at 1222–25.
164
Id. at 1222 (internal citations omitted).
165 Id.
166
Id. at 1224.
167 Id. at 1222–23. For examples of the split, see Yoo, supra note 14, at 466 nn.7–9 and
accompanying text.
168 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring).
169 Id.
162
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Justice Thomas continued to build his analogy with the “clear
historical precedent for regulating transportation and communications networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers.”170 He emphasized that, at their core, digital platforms are communications networks that carry information from one user to another in the way that all other communications networks do.171 Just
as courts required telegraphs to “serve all customers alike, without
discrimination” because of their resemblance to railroad companies
and other common carriers, so too should they with digital platforms.172
Finally, Justice Thomas suggested that common carrier status
may be conferred in exchange for “special government favors.”173
Without explicitly stating so, Justice Thomas is likely referring to
the immunity offered in Section 230 as a quid pro quo for common
carrier status.174 His opinion made no direct comparison.
In the alternative, Justice Thomas relied on German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis to argue that common carrier regulations may
be justifiably imposed on some industries not historically recognized as common carriers.175 This pseudo-common carrier status
arises when “a business, by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s]
from private [concern] to be of public concern.”176 Justice Thomas
conceded that most things can qualify as matters of “public concern.”177 But he stressed that digital platforms surely met the test for
non-common carrier industries subject to common carriage regulations because of their similarity to communications networks, which
have been historically recognized as traditional common carriers.178

170

Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1224 (“A traditional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network
connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastructure that can be controlled
in much the same way.”).
172 Id. at 1223 (quoting Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 14 (1894)).
173
Id.
174 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 472.
175
Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing German All. Insurance Co.
v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 411 (1914)).
176 Id. (quoting German, 233 U.S. at 411).
177 Id.
178 Id.
171
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3. Public Accommodations Doctrine
In the event that the common carrier analogy does not hold, Justice Thomas proposed that legislatures treat digital platforms like
places of public accommodation.179 Places of public accommodation, like common carriers, hold themselves out to the public.180 But
they “do not ‘carry’ freight, passengers, or communications” in the
way that common carriers do.181 He defined places of public accommodation as places providing “lodging, food, entertainment, or other
services to the public . . . in general.”182 Decisively, Justice Thomas
stated that digital platforms “bear resemblance to that definition.”183
With a notably shorter discussion of the analogy to public accommodations, Justice Thomas hinged the application of the public
accommodations doctrine to digital platforms on the “entertainment” they provide to the public.184 He also briefly cited Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, highlighting that the impositions of First
Amendment regulations on digital platforms “would not prohibit the
company from speaking or force the company to endorse the
speech.”185 In the way that this distinction allowed First Amendment
protection to outweigh individuals’ property right to exclude, Justice
Thomas argued that the same should be true of digital platforms.186

179

Id. at 1225 (“Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common carriers,
legislatures might still be able to treat digital platforms like places of public
accommodation.”).
180 Id.
181
Id. at 1223 (internal citation omitted).
182 Id. at 1225 (quoting Public Accommodation, B
LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019)).
183 Id.
184 Following his definition of “public accommodation,” Justice Thomas provided an
additional reference to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3). In a parenthetical, he highlighted that this
provision “cover[s] places of ‘entertainment.’” Id.
185
Knight, 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)). In Pruneyard, the Court held that a state
could properly recognize individual state-protected rights of expression on the property of
a privately owned shopping center, open to the public, without violating the shopping
center’s federally recognized property or First Amendment rights. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at
88. This holding did not compel the private property owner to accept the individuals’
views. Id. Moreover, the shopping center remained “free to publicly dissociate themselves
from the views of the speakers” in question. Id.
186 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1222–24 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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III. FAILED ANALOGIES
In Biden v. Knight, Justice Thomas called upon legislators to
recognize that digital platforms are “sufficiently akin to common
carriers or places of accommodation” such that they should be regulated under either common law framework.187 The precise definitions of a “common carrier” and a “place of public accommodation,”
however, are elusive.188 Moreover, the two concepts are so intertwined that the distinction is slight.189 Common carriers have historically constituted one of two types of public accommodations.190
Thus, the latter concept completely subsumes the former. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas treated common carriage and public accommodations as two distinct concepts. Accordingly, this Part addresses
each in turn.
A. Social Media Platforms Are Not Common Carriers
Early English common law defined a “common carrier” as “a
person [who] holds himself out to carry goods for everyone as a
business.”191 Crucially, a carrier that reserves the right to pick and
choose its passengers does not assume common carriage status.192
Common carriage responsibility at common law came from a combination of different factors. Two of the most important factors included the “public-facing” nature of the business and the degree to
which it affected the public interest.193 Social media platforms undoubtedly maintain a “public-facing” nature because “a primary
187

Id. at 1224.
See Yoo, supra note 14, at 465; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Essay, Common
Carriage’s Domain, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 991, 994–95 (2018) (“Over the years, scholars
and courts have repeated[ly] attempted to devise a coherent framework for determining
when common carriage should apply, without much success.”).
189 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 479.
190 Id. The second type of entity historically and universally accepted as constituting
public accommodations is an innkeeper. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 298 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing the obligation of innkeepers and common carriers to
indiscriminately serve all patrons and passengers, respectively, at common law).
191
Alfred Avins, What Is a Place of “Public” Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2
(1968) (quoting Ingate v. Christie, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (1850)).
192
See Hunt v. Clifford, 209 A.2d 182, 183 (Conn. 1965) (“Since passengers were not
accepted on this school bus indiscriminately but were restricted to pupils embraced in the
contract of transportation, the bus was not being operated as a common carrier of
passengers.”).
193 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1876).
188
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function of social-media providers is to receive content from users
and in turn to make the content available to other users.”194 This
means that the platforms always aim to serve the public. The degree
to which an entity affects the public interest is “hardly helpful,”195
however, because almost all entities could be construed to fit that
mark. The most frequently recited factor is whether the business at
issue offers its services to the public indiscriminately.196
There are two primary explanations why digital platforms do not
serve the public indiscriminately in a manner that would confer
common carrier status. First, social media platforms narrow their
services to those potential users with either a valid phone number or
email address. Second, the platforms employ algorithms that create
individualized experiences for each user, actively monitoring available content.
The public’s ability to enjoy what digital platforms offer is predicated on whether potential users have preexisting phone numbers
or email addresses.197 Accordingly, these platforms do not hold
themselves out as available to the entire public. Rather, they are
available only to the portion of the public with the requisite contact
information. Whether an entity holds itself out as offering services
to the public is widely accepted as the crux of common carrier status.198 Thus, this analogy fails on a crucial tenet of the doctrine.

194

NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1085 (N.D. Fla. 2021).
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
196 See Mark A. Hall, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act, 48 U. C . L.
HI
REV. 409, 413 (1981).
197 See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Facebook users must
first register for a Facebook account, providing their names, telephone numbers, and email
addresses.”)
(emphasis
added);
Facebook
Help
Center,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/158461840955940
[https://perma.cc/6ART-8NBQ]
(providing sign-up options with either a mobile phone number or email address); Twitter
Help Center, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/create-twitter-account
[https://perma.cc/3JUS-5DG7] (stating the same requirements); YouTube Help, YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/161805?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/BPZ74XBD] (requiring potential users to create a Google account in order to sign up for
YouTube).
198 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 473–74; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Broads. v. FCC, 740 F.2d
1190, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he sine qua non of a common carrier is the obligation to
accept applicants on a non-content oriented basis.”).
195
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Further, digital platforms’ use of algorithms independently defeats the common carrier analogy. Historically, common carriers
have little control over the content communicated through their networks.199 By contrast, digital social media platforms exert direct
control over the content with which users interact by filtering content through algorithms to personalize user experiences.200 The common carriage status of social media companies ultimately “turns on
whether they hold themselves out as serving all members of the public without making individualized business decisions.”201 As it
stands, social media companies exercise too much discretion over
the content prioritized and displayed to users to qualify as common
carriers.202 The digital platforms these companies offer employ algorithms that both moderate content and provide individualized

199

See Ryan Gerdes, Scaling Back § 230 Immunity: Why the Communications Decency
Act Should Take a Page from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Service Provider
Immunity Playbook, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 656 (2012).
200
See Tremble, supra note 44, at 838–39 (discussing how Facebook’s algorithm
prioritizes posts based on user’s previous interests and a post’s ability to gain “likes”); Will
Oremus et al., How Facebook Shapes Your Feed, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2021/how-facebook-algorithmworks/ [https://perma.cc/6HVM-5LWB] (describing Facebook’s “precisely tailored”
algorithm to elevate posts that encourage individual interaction); Force, 934 F.3d at 58
(explaining Facebook’s algorithms that “automatically analyze Facebook users’ prior
behavior” on its site to predict and display content most likely to interest and engage users);
Adam Mosseri, Shedding More Light on How Instagram Works, INSTAGRAM (June 8,
2021),
https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/shedding-more-light-on-howinstagram-works [https://perma.cc/MUL4-3UAH] (describing the “variety of algorithms”
Instagram employs to “personalize your experience”); FERENC HUSZÁR ET AL.,
ALGORITHMIC AMPLIFICATION OF POLITICS ON TWITTER (2021), https://cdn.cmstwdigitalassets.com/content/dam/blogtwitter/official/en_us/company/2021/rml/Algorithmic-Amplification-of-Politics-onTwitter.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8UW-232Q] (studying algorithmic amplification within the
context of political groups and its role in shaping political content consumption).
201 Yoo, supra note 14, at 505 (emphasis added).
202
Force, 934 F.3d at 66 (noting that interactive computer services have made editorial
decisions regarding third-party content “since the early days of the Internet”). For more
details on how Facebook utilizes machine learning and ranking algorithms to design
personalized News Feeds for individual users, see Akos Lada et al., How Machine
Learning Powers Facebook’s News Feed Ranking Algorithm, ENG’G META (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://engineering.fb.com/2021/01/26/ml-applications/news-feed-ranking/
[https://perma.cc/MN6G-NNNE].
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navigation through the seemingly endless stream of available content.203 Content moderation algorithms plainly constitute individualized business decisions because these mechanisms determine
whether certain content is permitted to exist on the platform.204 Navigation algorithms are yet another way social media companies exert
editorial discretion over third-party content because the “matchmaking”205 goal of these algorithms is nothing more than deciding where
and in what format to place the content shown to a user in the first
place.206 Social media companies retain a degree of control over
their content such that they may not be properly categorized as common carriers.207
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s argument that the analogy to common carriers is “even clearer” for those platforms that enjoy “dominant market share” is misplaced.208 Common carriage status has
never “turn[ed] on whether the entity in question possesses market
power,”209 a conclusion Justice Thomas concedes.210 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court established that
“the concentration of market power among large social-media providers does not change the governing First Amendment principles.”211

203

For more on the distinction between content and navigation algorithms, see Sofia
Grafanaki, Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating the Filters, 39
PACE L. REV. 111, 117–18 (2018).
204 Id. at 138. The decision whether to publish or withdraw content fits squarely in the
realm of traditional editorial functions. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th
Cir. 1997).
205
Force, 934 F.3d at 65 (describing the “matchmaking” function as an algorithm’s way
to “predict and show the third-party content that is most likely to interest and engage
users”).
206 See id. at 66 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Facebook is ineligible for Section
230(c)(1) immunity “by virtue of simply organizing and displaying content exclusively
provided by third parties.”).
207 For an in-depth discussion of content moderation and social media companies, see
generally Olivier Sylvain, Platform Realism, Informational Inequality, and Section 230
Reform, 131 YALE L.J. F. 475 (2021).
208
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
209 Yoo, supra note 14, at 479.
210 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1223, 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring).
211 Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1974).
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In Justice Thomas’s alternative argument, digital platforms cannot still be regulated like common carriers under the German Alliance precedent.212 In that case, the Court subjected fire insurance
rates to state regulation even though fire insurance companies were
not traditional common carriers.213 Although a contract for fire insurance is personal, the “effect of insurance . . . is to distribute the
loss over as wide an area as possible.”214 Since a large part of the
country was protected by fire insurance and thus subjected to its
rates, the regulation of fire insurance rates “demonstrate[d] the interest of the public” such that state regulation was justified.215
Insurance contracts are, by nature, interdependent. Their relation
to other insurance holders is to create a fund of assurance and
credit.216 Thus, even though a fire insurance company was not a traditional common carrier, the business was properly considered “of
the greatest public concern” and necessarily subject to governmental
regulation.217 By contrast, participation in social media platforms
creates networks of people with whom users can engage and communicate. While these networks are also interdependent, the connection between mutual funds in the event of a fire and mutual networks providing interpersonal contact is too attenuated to properly
apply the German Alliance precedent in the digital social media context.
B. Social Media Platforms Are Not Places of Public
Accommodation
The common law definition of public accommodation explicitly
includes innkeepers and common carriers.218 Public accommodation
status for businesses outside these two categories often turns on
whether the business holds itself out as serving the public.219 Following the Civil War, many states initially passed statutes requiring
212

See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
See German All. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 413 (1914).
214
Id. at 412.
215 Id. at 413.
216
Id. at 414.
217 Id.
218 See Yoo, supra note 14, at 476.
219 See id. at 477 (citing Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996)).
213
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places of public accommodation to serve all members of the public,
regardless of race.220 While many states eventually repealed these
statutes, state courts interpret public accommodations laws narrowly.221 This reaffirmed the understanding that public accommodations regulations only extended to innkeepers and common carriers.222
Presently, public accommodations law is primarily statutory.223
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically provides a list of places
that constitute public accommodations, including inns, restaurants,
gas stations, and places of entertainment.224 The Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) similarly provides a defined list of places
of public accommodation subject to its provisions.225 This more expansive list includes common carriers, innkeepers, restaurants,
places of entertainment, retail stores, offices of physicians and lawyers, laundromats, barber shops, funeral parlors, hospitals, insurance
agents, and schools.226 Notably, all of the specified examples of
places of public accommodation in both statutes are physical
spaces.227
Circuits are split on whether non-physical spaces, like websites,
constitute places of public accommodation.228 In the context of the
ADA, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have found that the
statute applies to non-physical spaces like websites, regardless of
whether the website is connected to a physical space.229 Courts in
these circuits turn to Congress’s intent, policy concerns, and the

220

See id. (noting that courts applied public accommodations status only to places
explicitly listed in civil rights statutes).
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 478.
224 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)–(3).
225
Id. § 12181(7).
226 Id.
227
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)–(3).
228 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
229 Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2017); see also
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The defendant asks us to
interpret ‘public accommodation’ literally, as denoting a physical site, such as a store or a
hotel, but we have already rejected that interpretation.”).
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legislative history behind the ADA, finding that “Congress intended
the ADA to adapt to changes in technology.”230
Meanwhile, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have found that
places of public accommodations are limited to physical spaces.231
Courts in these circuits rely on the enumerated categories explicitly
listed in the statute and specifically note that all examples are physical spaces.232 In a recent opinion, the Eleventh Circuit joined this
group of circuits and held that it could not broaden the definition of
public accommodation to include non-physical spaces, such as websites, absent congressional action.233
Importantly, this circuit split almost exclusively revolves around
the categorization of “a place of accommodation” for the purposes
of the ADA. Accordingly, many of the opinions look to the intent
behind the ADA to justify the extension of public accommodations
status to non-physical spaces like websites.234 Opinions rejecting
this extension rely heavily on the textual argument that the statutes
only list physical places.235
The public accommodations doctrine does not apply to social
media platforms under either reasoning. From a purely textual standpoint, several circuit courts are sufficiently convinced that it is not
within their judicial duty to expand the definition for places of public

230

Gil, 242 F. Supp. at 1319 (internal citation omitted). See also Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v.
Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that even if the
meaning of “public accommodations” is ambiguous, which the court finds it is not, public
policy concerns persuade that its meaning is “not limited to actual physical structures”).
231
Gil, 242 F. Supp. at 1319.
232 See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding
that “public accommodation” does not refer to non-physical spaces); Parker v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010–11 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that a public accommodation is
a physical place); Earll v. Ebay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that
a “place of public accommodation” requires a physical place).
233 Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 993 F.3d 1266, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc
denied per curiam, No. 17-13467-CC, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 5561 (11th Cir. Mar. 2,
2022).
234
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200–01 (D.
Mass. 2012) (“[T]he legislative history of the ADA makes clear that Congress intended the
ADA to adapt to changes in technology.”).
235 Ford, 145 F.3d at 614 (relying on noscitur a sociis, a Latin canon, to hold that “public
accommodation” does not refer to non-physical spaces).
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accommodation without a directive from the legislature.236 Notwithstanding unexpected technological advancements that followed both
the Civil Rights Act and the ADA’s enactments, the explicit enumeration of physical spaces as examples of places of public accommodations leaves little room to extrapolate the definition to nonphysical spaces.237
Alternatively, expanding the definition of “places of public accommodation” to include non-physical spaces in the context of Section 230 requires consideration of the policy and legislative intent
behind Section 230 itself.238 The legislative intent behind this provision’s enactment importantly sought to protect the robust growth
of the then-nascent internet and limit governmental regulation.239
Neither goal suggests that Section 230 was designed to regulate
spaces that qualify as traditional places of public accommodations.
First, imposing public accommodations duties on social media
platforms would stunt the “vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services.”240 Requiring these platforms to indiscriminately avail themselves to the public would prohibit their use of algorithms to individualize user experience.241 Social media platforms like Facebook
and Twitter aim to facilitate conversations between users and create
connections.242 These purposes would be impossible to achieve
236

See, e.g., Gil, 993 F.3d at 1284 (“Absent congressional action that broadens the
definition of ‘places of public accommodation’ to include websites, we cannot extend ADA
liability . . . .”).
237
See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir.
2000) (“All the items on this list, however, have something in common. They are actual,
physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public
gets those goods or services.”).
238 See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
239 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (“It is the policy of the United States—(1) to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other
interactive media; [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation.”).
240 Id. § 230(b)(2).
241
See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 67 (2d Cir. 2019) (“‘[C]onnections’
or ‘matches’ of information and individuals . . . would . . . not occur[] but for the internet
services’ particular editorial choices regarding the display of third-party content.”).
242 See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg Gives Facebook a New Mission,
FORBES (June 22, 2017, 12:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/
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without the algorithms that individualize the experience through editorial functioning.243
Second, the important policy goal of limiting governmental regulation urges against imposing public accommodations duties on
digital platforms and ISPs.244 When Section 230 was introduced, the
internet was seen as a medium of amplified opportunity and individual empowerment.245 Under this view, it was crucial to create safeguards that would not only encourage democratic discourse on the
internet, but also protect the internet from paternalistic governmental regulation.246 This second goal, in particular, militates against an
understanding that the drafters of Section 230 intended the public
accommodations doctrine—a doctrine that invites governmental
regulations—to apply to the non-physical space of the digital platforms it protects. Recognizing digital platforms and ISPs as places
of public accommodation would grant governments the power to
limit their “right to exclude.”247 This would necessarily saturate
websites with governmental regulations, directly opposing the statute’s stated purpose.

2017/06/22/mark-zuckerberg-gives-facebook-a-new-mission/?sh=6e0608f61343
[https://perma.cc/JJ2R-JNBH] (“[Facebook CEO Mark] Zuckerberg unveiled Facebook’s
updated purpose: ‘[g]ive people the power to build community and bring the world closer
together.’”); Nicholas Thompson, Jack Dorsey on Twitter’s Role in Free Speech and Filter
Bubbles, WIRED (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/jack-dorseytwitters-role-free-speech-filter-bubbles/ [https://perma.cc/8B7E-FH9Q] (noting that
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey states Twitter’s purpose is “to serve the public conversation”).
243 See, e.g., Will Oremus, Why Facebook Won’t Let You Control Your Own News Feed,
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2021, 12:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2021/11/13/facebook-news-feed-algorithm-how-to-turn-it-off/ [https://perma.cc/UH7SPSKY] (referencing an internal Facebook report that found when users turned off the
algorithm on their news feeds, it caused them to “interact less”).
244
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (stating that one of the policy goals behind Section 230 is to
ensure the internet and other interactive computer services remain “unfettered by Federal
or State regulation”).
245 See Cannon, supra note 54, at 93.
246 See id.
247 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
Of all types of ISPs, social media platforms have garnered the
most attention and created the most controversy over how to address
liability.248 This includes platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube, where third-party users may post or upload their own content. On its face, these websites seem to unequivocally fall within
the protections provided by Section 230: they are interactive computer service providers that host information provided by other,
third-party content providers.249 Many scholars arguing against immunity for these platforms, however, point to their intricate content
moderation.250 In their view, this editorial function amounts to creating or developing the information.251 This makes the digital platforms information content providers, not just interactive computer
service providers.252
Since the internet has become the “modern public square,”253 a
clear liability scheme for facilitators of public conversations in this
medium is essential to the future of free speech. In the years since
its enactment, Section 230 and its judicial interpretations as applied
to social media platforms have spurred much controversy, particularly across political lines. While the political right demands

248

Cameron F. Kerry, Section 230 Reform Deserves Careful and Focused Consideration,
BROOKINGS (May 14, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/05/14/
section-230-reform-deserves-careful-and-focused-consideration/ [https://perma.cc/8UBN596U] (noting that many concerns about online content impacted by Section 230 focus on
“the largest of the social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter”).
249 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (shielding “provider[s] . . . of an interactive computer service”
from liability for “any information provided by another information content provider”).
250 See Tremble, supra note 44, at 865–67 (arguing that Facebook’s use of algorithms to
increase user engagement constitutes material contribution to the development of the
content).
251 See id.
252
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (providing, “[t]he term ‘information content provider’
means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.”), with id. § 230(f)(2) (providing, “[t]he term ‘interactive computer
service’ means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically
a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”).
253 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
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accountability for social media’s “de-platforming of conservatives,”254 the political left seeks accountability for social media’s
part in disseminating false information.255 As it stands, there are numerous bills pending in Congress to reform or repeal this provision.256
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has not indicated any intention
to address this statute. Justice Thomas is the only Justice who has
opined on Section 230’s current scope. Most recently, he released
his third solo statement disparaging Section 230’s expansive reach
in Doe v. Facebook, Inc.257 While Justice Thomas does not offer
substantive proposals for reform like he did in Biden v. Knight, his
statement in Doe reinforces his calls to repeal Section 230 and sends
out a “bat signal” for litigants pursuing social media companies.258
Justice Thomas calls on those litigants to bring an appropriate suit
before the Court to give the Justices an opportunity to tackle the
controversial issues raised by Section 230.259
While Justice Thomas is right to suggest the need for legislative
reform given the prevalence of digital platforms, this Note explicitly
rejects the analogies to the common carrier and public accommodations doctrines he proposed in Biden v. Knight. Social media
254

Adam Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality,
and Section 230, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 391, 394 n.9 (2020) (citing Sue Halpern, The
Search for Anti-Conservative Bias on Google, NEW YORKER (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-search-for-anti-conservativebias-on-google [https://perma.cc/3U5Z-Y8FJ]).
255 See, e.g., Shannon Bond, Democrats Want to Hold Social Media Companies
Responsible for Health Misinformation, NPR (July 22, 2021, 3:59 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/22/1019346177/democrats-want-to-hold-social-mediacompanies-responsible-for-health-misinformat [https://perma.cc/ZNW2-6PQ9].
256 See Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment. Now Both
Republicans and Democrats Want to Take It Away, REASON (July 29, 2019, 8:01 AM),
https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-now-bothrepublicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away
[https://perma.cc/GE2A-LM3J];
Cristiano Lima, How a Widening Political Rift over Online Liability Is Splitting
Washington, POLITICO (July 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/09/onlineindustry-immunity-section-230-1552241 [https://perma.cc/7CBW-H6YQ].
257 142 S. Ct. 1087 (2022) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
258
Kelsey Reichmann, Thomas Sends Out Bat Signal for Suits Going After Web
Publishers, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.courthousenews.com/
thomas-sends-out-bat-signal-for-suits-going-after-web-publishers/
[https://perma.cc/X5CG-ZEL9].
259 See generally Doe, 142 S. Ct. 1087.
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platforms’ well-known use of algorithms definitively precludes
common carriage status. The legislative history of Section 230 prohibits the imposition of the public accommodations doctrine.
Traditional common law doctrines do not apply to the modern
context of digital platforms and social media. Rather, proposals for
reform should be tailored to remedy the specific and dangerous realworld consequences that can result from social media activity. For
example, providers or users of interactive computer services who
display deliberate indifference to unlawful or harmful content or
conduct should not enjoy Section 230 immunity. If a social media
company knows of a harmful post or knows of or reasonably anticipates a dangerous outcome arising from such a post, that company
should have a legal duty to block the post or otherwise minimize its
amplification.260 Deliberate indifference to such harms does not deserve Section 230 protection.
Whatever the legislative fix, it must align with the legislative
purpose behind the statute in the first place. This requires protecting
the internet from governmental regulation, not inviting it in.
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See Sylvain, supra note 207, at 511.

